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VI.—ON *ἥPIN* IN THE ATTIC ORATORS.

The temporal particle *πρίν* has had its full share of attention, not only in general works on Greek grammar, Greek syntax, Greek moods and tenses, Greek particles, but also in special treatises. Essays have been written on *πρίν* in Homer, *πρίν* in Herodotos, *πρίν* in Thukydides, *πρίν* in the Attic drama.¹ And yet, in spite of thought and research, there is a strange lack of clearness and sharpness in the treatment. One distinguished scholar lapses into a gross solecism while traversing this slippery field; another is struck with blindness and gropes his way among unrecognized negatives. Theory of origin, limitation of use, are often so presented as not only to confuse the beginner, but to bewilder more advanced students who desire coherence and consistency. Of course the solution of all such problems is to be sought in the history of the language, in the growth or decay of a given construction. We begin, if Paley will suffer us, with Homer, and trace the expansion in one direction, the contraction in another. All this is well enough; but when the most evident counter-sense is extorted from the facts as ascertained, surely even history loses its rights. What is the use of accumulating and sorting historical facts, if the common-sense interpretation of the facts themselves is denied? The tendency in language is to crystallize into sharper logical formulae; the difference of earlier from later syntax consists in its greater elasticity. Optative and subjunctive are sundered in the later speech; in the earlier they can be used in the same breath

¹ R. Foerster. De usu coniunctionis *πρίν* Homérico et Hesiodéo; de usu particulae *πρίν*, qualis apud Ionicos scriptores fuerit Miscell. Sem. philol. et Soc. lat. 1863 et 65.

R. Richter. De particulis *πρίν* et *πάρως* earumque usu Homérico. Lipsiae, 1874.

O. Prause. De particulae *πρίν* usu tragico et Aristophaneo. Halis Saxonum, 1876.

See also a review by C. Capelle in Philologus XXXVII, s. 89, in which he takes up—

Herzog. Die syntax des infinitivs NJB. f. Phil. u. Paedagogik, 1873, pp. 1-33.

Caullin. De temporum infinitivi usu Homérico. Lund, 1873.

and in the same general sense. Now if a man fails to recognize a simple rule, a simple mechanical rule that has stamped itself indelibly on the fixed language, how can he be trusted with the far more difficult restoration of the period of fluctuation, of growth? In my attempts to satisfy my scholars and myself in such matters I have always tried to get first a clear notion of the actual normal usage of Attic prose before undertaking to explore the genesis. Those who set out on the historical study of Greek syntax without a fairly accurate notion of the limits of prose are sure to get lost. Nothing do I deplore so much in the practice of teaching Greek as the fashion of beginning at the very first moment possible with Homer. Greek poetry is a sealed book to many students of Greek all their lives, because they have never had any sharp consciousness of the difference between poetry and prose. All Greek was Greek from the beginning; and the sense, when not cultivated early, can only be acquired in later years by painful study. One is tempted to say: Let boys read Homer on condition of translating him into prose Greek. Of course it will be said that if one attempts to formulate Attic usage without the necessary historical survey, there is danger of being swayed by abstract reasoning. But abstract reasoning is after all better than such unreason as prevails in the interpretation of many of the earlier phenomena of the language. May I be permitted to give one or two illustrations in the matter of *πρίν*?

Πρίν, abstractly considered, is a comparative formation. It is found, though not often, in the earliest times with $\tilde{\eta}$. I shall not discuss the original quantity. The historical Greek seems to have felt it as short. What follows from its comparative formation? A distinctly negative character. This negative character of the comparative sometimes individualizes itself, so to speak, and appears in the form of an independent negative following the comparative, a kind of armor-bearer so familiar in the Romance languages, *plus que ne*, *più che non*. But the negative usually makes itself felt in less direct ways. All negatives tend either to reduplication or to concentration. The negative either revolves so as to show various facets, or it takes some energetic single form as the essence of denial. On the one hand we have the so-called double negatives, on the other hand the combination with the aorist. The natural tense of the negative is the aorist. The tenses of continuance are used with the negative only when there is a notion of opposition to the positive, of resistance to pressure. So in our language, as

it is far less rich in forms than the Greek or even the Latin, we introduce words of will and effort to express the effect of the negative with the imperfect in Greek; οὐχ εἶλον *they did not take*, but οὐχ ᾔρουν *they would not, they could not take*. Is this rudimentary? If so, why is not the 'abstract principle' applied to πρίν? Why is it not formulated that πρίν, as a negative (= οὐπω, with which it is often coupled), takes the aorist? The deep silence of nearly all the school grammars on this simple, practical matter is remarkable. What do we find in more pretentious works that do recognize the predominance of the aorist? Kühner in his *Ausführliche Grammatik* calmly says: 'The usual tense of the infinitive with πρίν is the aor., which represents the action of the dependent clause as prior to that of the principal clause,' and his very first example is *N 172*: ναῖτε δὲ Πήδαιον πρίν ἐλθεῖν υἱας Ἀχαιῶν. If his rule is applied literally, the action in ἐλθεῖν precedes the action in ναῖτε. Perhaps, however, the distinguished grammarian meant that the non-action of the dependent clause preceded the action of the leading clause, but he took a strange way to express it.¹ In fact he was thinking of the combination with negative clauses, in which the antecedence in time of the dependent clause follows from the negation. For πρίν ἐλθεῖν substitute οὐπω ἐλθόντων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, and the whole matter becomes clear. With a πρίν ἄν sentence, μήπω would be used on account of the conditional element. So *Andok. 1, 7*: οὐχ οἶόν τε ὕμᾱς εἰδέναι πρίν ἂν καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσῃτε ἀπολογομένου could be transcribed by οὐχ οἶόν τε ὕμᾱς εἰδέναι μήπω καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσαντας. The negative, I repeat, is sufficient to cover all cases. A recent writer, Cavallin (ap. Capelle, *Philologus* XXXVII, s. 89), says that πρίν and πάρος almost always take the aor. of the inf. in Homer, because for the most part only the ingress or the realization and not the duration of the action is had in view. One wearies of this schematic difference between present and aorist. Of the three Homeric passages, μέδεσθαι *Σ* 245, ἀμφιφάσθαι *τ* 475 form no aor. that we know of; ἄγειν *A* 98 follows δόμεναι 'mit sinniger Unterscheidung,' but with the same 'sinnige Unterscheidung' that distinguishes the negative with the durative tenses from the negative with the aorist. The aorist then is the rule, and the

¹ Aken correctly reverses Kühner's statement when he says, in discussing ἵστράπτει πρίν βροντᾶν: man kann geradezu sagen dass die Handlung bei πρίν vom Standpunkte des Hauptsatzes aus stets eine zukünftige, noch nicht existirende sei also nur begrifflich zu bezeichnen war, wie durch ein Verbalsubstantiv. Aken *Schulgr.* 449, Anm. 1.

present infinitive and the perfect infinitive are used with *πρὶν* just in the same relations in which tenses of duration and completion are employed with negatives. So Thuc. 3, 24, 2: ἀπετράποντο ἐς τὴν πόλιν πρὶν ὑπερβαίνειν (= οὐχ ὑπερέβαινον, 'they would not attempt to scale'). So Isai. 7, 29: πρὶν ἐμὲ ἵκησιν (= Pf.) = οὐπω ἵχον.

It is well known that in the Greek of the classic period *πρὶν* (ἄν) with the subjunctive and *πρὶν* with the opt. require a negative in the leading clause. There is but one exception, and that in a passage which I should not hesitate to alter. The later Greeks use *πρὶν* ᾗ with the subjunctive after anything, and so do the modern; and I set down the *πρὶν ἵχεται* of Simonides Amorginus 1, 12 to a clerical lapse.¹ The other places, sometimes cited even in good books, have long

¹ The verses read: φθάνει δὲ τὸν μὲν γῆρας ἀζηλον λαβὼν | πρὶν τέρμ' ἵκηται. I find the following explanation of the anomalous construction cited by Buchholz, apparently with approval: Hier der Conjunctiv statt des Infinitivs gewählt weil der Fall gemeint ist, wo der Sterbliche wirklich zu Reichthum gelangt = οὐχ ἵζεται τέρμα πρὶν αὐτὸν γῆρας λάβῃ, während beim Infinitiv die natürliche Fassung der Worte an sich, mit Ausserachtung des Folgenden, wäre dass er auch dann nichts erlange.—Die Structuren von *πρὶν* in der Berliner Zeitsch. für Gymnasialwesen 1866, s. 595. Any one familiar with short and easy methods of despatching grammatical difficulties will recognize the work of making a translation do the duty of proof. Φθάνω with *πρὶν* happens to be a common construction, from II 322 on, and invariably takes the infinitive when positive. 'Mit Ausserachtung des Folgenden' is a condition which no one who used the language seems to have availed himself of. Antiphon 1, 29: εἰν μὲν . . . φθάνωσι πρὶν ἀποθανεῖν . . . φίλους καλοῦσι should be turned into πρὶν (ἂν) ἀποθάνωσι on exactly the same principle, because the persons in question actually die, whereas the infinitive leads to the inference, 'outside of the context and of common sense, that they do not die. *Πρὶν* is an οὐπω. The 'not yet' may come later, may never come. As I have said of *antequam* with the subjunctive, the antecedence is necessary, not so the consequence. 'Ἀπέδρασαν πρὶν κριθῆναι X. Hell. 1, 7, 35: they never came to trial. Καὶ πρὶν ἀρξαι ἄξιός τῆς βασιλείας ἐδόκει εἶναι Ἀγησίλαος Xen. Ag. 1, 5: Agesilaos actually became king. If you substitute ἥρξε you change the sense. The context must decide as in the case of the English verbal in *-ing*. Such vagueness may have been highly reprehensible, but until we can get better evidence for such a use of the subjunctive after positive *πρὶν* than the passage in Simonides, we must consider the modification suggested as unproved for the earlier period. I would venture to add that some commonplace of proverbial philosophy such as we find in Soph. O. T. 1529: μηδέν' ὀλβίξειεν πρὶν ἂν | τέρμα τοῦ βίου περάσῃ, might have been present to the mind of the copyist and deflected his pen, as if οὐ δεῖ γῆρας ζηλοῦν πρὶν (ἂν) τέρμ' ἵκηται, which of course has nothing to do with the sense of the passage.

been shown to be normal. So in Isokr. 4, 16 *λίαν ἀπλῶς ἔχει* = *οὐ δεῖ οὔτεσθαι*. See the next sentence, with its *ἀλλὰ δεῖ*. So in Dem. 38, 24 *σιωπᾶν* is a negative idea and is explained by *μὴ κατηγορεῖν*. So Lys. 22, 4 *αἰσχροὺν* is a negative = *οὐ δεῖν*. To judge by parallel passages *πρὶν ἄν* was felt as *ἕως ἄν* or *ἕν μὴ*. The same rule applies, of course, to the much rarer *πρὶν* with the opt., and whatever may be thought of the principle of it, the fact is firmly established. And yet a grammarian no less distinguished than Bäumlein commits himself to an extraordinary solecism when he says that in Aischylos S. c. Theb. 452 foll., where we have *ῥλοιθ' ὅς πρόλει | μεγάλ' ἐπεύχεται | κεραινοῦ δέ νιν βέλος ἐπισχέθαι | πρὶν ἐμὸν ἐσθιορεῖν δόμον, πρὶν* with the opt. can stand, citing as a proof Soph. Phil. 961: *ῥλοιτο μῆπω πρὶν μάθωμι*!

As for *πρὶν* with the indic., it is commonly stated that it occurs chiefly after negative clauses. That is true, but it is somewhat confusing to find it used in affirmative sentences in Thukyd. and Euripides. The fact is that the indicative is not a legitimate construction unless *πρὶν* is used in a sense which is equivalent to *ἕως* 'until.' This, though clearly recognized in some grammars, is not universally recognized. When this condition fails, then the infinitive must be used. Of course in the majority of instances the negative with *πρὶν* does compel such a sense; but the very grammarians, who emphasize the rule, stick to the letter so closely that they fail to see virtual negatives when they are thrust upon them. So Kühner cites as affirmatives Thuc. 1, 51, 2: *ἐθαύμαζον πρὶν . . . εἶπον*—1, 118, 2: *οὐτε ἐκώλυον ἡσύχαζόν τε . . . πρὶν δὴ . . . ἡ δύναμις σαφῶς ἤρρετο* (comp. Eur. I. T. 489–90: *ἄφρων* (= *οὐκ ἐφρόνου*) *νέος τ' ἦν πρὶν . . . ἐσεῖδον*)—3, 29, 1: *λανθάνουσι* (= *οὐκ ὀρόνται*) *πρὶν δὴ . . . ἔσχον*—7, 71, 5: *τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας διελύθη πρὶν δὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τότε τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐποιήσαν*. Comp. also X. An. 2, 5, 33: *ὁ τι ἐποιοῦν ἡμφιγρόον πρὶν Νίκαρχος ἡλθε*. It is needless to say that all these verbs are negative either in fact or in sense. I have not the slightest objection to putting them all under the 'until' class, but if a distinction is to be made between positive and negative, it betrays a strange ablepsys to make a wrong distribution here.

It is not the object of this paper to give a full history or a full theory of *πρὶν*, and what I have said and shall say on the subject is merely prefatory to a presentation of some practical statements in regard to the use of *πρὶν* in one department of Greek literature. In Homer *πρὶν* appears as an adverb, as a conjunction, as a quasi preposition. The conjunctive use develops out of the adverbial,

but the reigning construction is the quasi-prepositional (with the infinitive), which is used freely both after negative and positive clauses, whereas in prose it is found chiefly after positive clauses. This bold combination is a sad puzzle to determined theorists, who wish to allow no sudden leap in the constructions of language. We are still at a long remove from the preposition with the infinitive, the full development of which seems to require the article.¹ Even ὅσπερ with the inf., which with the negative might in some cases replace πρίν, has scarce budded. Interesting in connection with this problem is the direct combination of ἀντί with the anarthous inf., of which traces are found in the MSS. of Herodotos (I, 210; 6, 32; 7, 70), especially in view of the similar negative sense. Still the analogy is slight and the leap great, though as yet I see no escape from the quasi-prepositional use such as we find in our English 'than,' which even grammarians have not been able to separate from the love of 'whom.' Forssmann says in his treatise on the infinitive in Thukydides (Curt. Stud. 6, 53) that the infinitive with πρίν is a verbal noun, but he does not venture to say that πρίν before the inf. is a preposition, though he so translates it. Jolly, looking at the matter from the Indo-Germanic point of view, has no difficulty about it (Geschichte des Infinitivs, s. 221). That πρίν γενέσθαι and πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι are close equivalents can be seen from the interchange.²

As I have pointed out on another occasion, the infinitive must have lost its case force before it could have submitted to the combination;³ but it had lost its case force as early as the Homeric period, and hence I see no insuperable objection to this fling of the language. Forssmann's proof that the infinitive here is a verbal noun because it sometimes occurs in the present is, in my judg-

¹ Die Verbindung des Infinitivs mit einer Präposition ist der älteren Sprache durchaus fremd und hat sich erst später entwickelt, als man den Infinitiv mit vorgesetztem Artikel ganz als Substantiv behandelte. Kühner, Ausführl. Gr. II, s. 962.

² So in Plato's Phaidon Πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν [τὴν ἐπιστήμην] εἰληφέναι. *ἔοικεν. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν λαβόντες αὐτὴν πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἔχοντες ἐγενόμεθα, ἠπιστάμεθα καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι καὶ εὐθὺς γενόμενοι κτέ. 75 C ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν εἶναι τούτων ἀπάντων τὰς ἐπιστήμας πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι εἰληφέναι. 75 D, cf. B: πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκοῦεν . . . τυχεῖν ἔδει πον εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην. The only possible difference between the conception of πρίν γενέσθαι and πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι lies in the deictic force of the article. The tense is determined by the same principles in both cases.

³ Transactions of Am. Philol. Assoc. 1878.

ment, a perfect *non sequitur*. The infinitive as a verbal noun is still under the influence of tense feeling, and the exclusive use of present infinitive or aorist infinitive of any special verb according to the character of the action would not be surprising.¹

¹ Since this paper was written I have received the Transactions of the Oxford Philological Society for 1880-1881, in which Mr. Monro remarks (on the origin of the construction of infinitive with *πρίν* and *πάρῳς*): "It may now be regarded as certain that the Greek infinitive is in form the dative of an abstract noun (*δόμεν-αι* for *giving*), and in meaning a dative of consequence. Most Homeric uses of the infinitive lend themselves readily to this view: thus *ἐθέλει δόμεναι* 'he is willing for giving,' *δύναται δόμεναι* 'he has power for giving,' *ἐπιομαι εἶναι* 'I boast for (in respect of) being'; *μοῖρ' ἐστὶ δαμῆναι*, 'there is fate for being subdued,' etc. The chief exception is the use with *πρίν* and *πάρῳς*. What is the link between *πρίν ἐλθέμεν*, lit. *earlier for coming* and 'earlier than coming'?"

"The explanation is suggested by comparison of the Sanskrit usage. The infinitive in Sanskrit is in a less formed state than in Greek, and in particular there is no restriction of infinitival uses to a single case (as in Greek to the dative). Now among the other cases used to form infinitives (or in the way to be so used) is the ablative (which is found especially with the prepositions *ā* 'until' and *purā* 'before' (Whitney's Sanskrit grammar, § 983; Max Müller, *Chips*, vol. IV, p. 53). The ablative is of course used with *purā* as with comparatives. In Greek, therefore, it is probable that the dative inf. with *πρίν* has taken the place of an older ablative. The process by which one case-form concentrates uses originally belonging to several cases, is one of which many examples can be produced. In this instance it was doubtless accelerated by the loss of the dative form in other nouns, so that the infinitive ceased to be regarded as a case-form."

I cannot now go into the discussion of this theory, and would only say here that mere analogy is not a proof. The Greek goes its own way in the handling of the infinitive, and such licences as the use of *πρίν* with the inf. must be judged from within. Judged from within, *πρίν* with the inf. is an experiment rather than a survival. Again, the dative force of the infinitive was not felt in the Homeric time; this seems to be shown by the *oratio obliqua* use of the infinitive. For that matter the rhematic sign *το* is not fully felt in English, though so much more marked by its independent existence than the dative termination of the inf. But Mr. Monro by his translation of the Homeric infinitive seems to imply that it was felt in the Homeric time. If so, how could the inf. be used as an ablative? It would have been more reasonable to say that *πρίν* w. inf., originally equivalent to some such later periphrasis as *πρότερον ἢ ὥστε* 'earlier for coming' = 'too soon for,' became in time a mere formula and the peculiar shade of 'prevention' was lost except as brought out by the context. Comp. *prius quam* w. subj. in which the subj. seems to be due to the element of 'preference' (*prius quam* = *potius quam*) or 'prevention' (*prius quam* = *prius quam ut*, like *maior quam ut*) and afterward to have faded into mere subordination, mere temporal limit. The fluctuation and differentiation of these

Other attempts have been made to explain the construction of $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ with the inf. Richter considers $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ to have become a conjunction by 'correlation,' and that not only with the subj. and opt., but also with the inf. Capelle says that he does not understand Richter's explanation, and as I have not access to Richter's dissertation, I can only gather that this view is not essentially different from Hartung's (Gr. Partikeln I 61 foll.) accepted by Kühner II 779. Hartung quotes Catullus, as cited by Quint. 9, 3, 16: *dum intacta (innupta) manet, dum cara suis est*, and translates—'die Weile (so long) sie unberührt bleibt, die Weile (so long) ist sie den Ihrigen lieb.' The indifference of *dum* here is clearly due to the coextensiveness of the action. This is not true of $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$. Take the following sentence in which we have *prius* twice. *Prius quam istam pugnam pugnabo, ego etiam prius dabo aliam pugnam*. Plaut. Pseud. 524. Do away with that little *quam*, and how are you to elicit the sense desiderated from *prius istam pugnam pugnabo, prius dabo aliam pugnam*? Evidently this will not work. Kühner translates H 481: οὐδὲς τις ἔτελε $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ πίνειν $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ λείψαι ὑπερμύξει *Kρυνίῳ* 'und Niemand wagte *ehe* zu trinken, *ehe* liess er u. s. w., Where did the 'liess' come from? Zeugma from ἔτελε? A 97

temporal particles may be seen in Engl. *rather, sooner, before*, and Germ. *ehe(r), bevor*. In *rather* the preferential significance has long excluded the temporal, in *sooner*, with which comp. Lat. *citius*, it has gained ground, while *before* is prevalently temporal. In German *bevor* is strictly temporal, *eher* must be used when preference is indicated, sometimes both are combined. (Compare $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ — $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$). If such a flattening of the final sense of the dative infinitive be allowed, we might save either the leap in construction or the merging of form—both hazardous hypotheses. Still we have to confront the fact that in the earliest time of which we know anything the dat. sense of the inf. was obscured to the Greek feeling, and $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ may have been a daring experiment, which succeeded, while others failed. So *forto* in English with the inf. has held its own, if not in current literature yet in vulgar speech; while 'ayenst to conforme' and 'without to wyll' and the others cited by Dr. Fitzedward Hall in the last number of this Journal (p. 295) were failures like *ἀντί* w. inf. When we have to deal with such a form as the infinitive, we must be on the lookout for such experiments. The history of the Romance languages shows similar attempts. Who believes that the Romans ever combined all their prepositions with the gerund? In French, Italian, Spanish, only a few prepositional combinations remain out of a number which was never large. In German we have only *um zu* (final), *anstatt zu* (*ἀντί*), *ohne zu* (negative). Hence I have used the word 'experiment' and not the word 'survival,' which seems to belong more properly to the persistence of an organic form.

which K. cites is still worse: οὐδ' ὁ γε πρὶν λοιμοῦ βαρείας κήρας ἀφ' ἑξέει πρὶν γ(ε) . . . δόμεναι, where δόμεναι will have to depend on the notion of 'consent' involved in the refusal of the other person. Parataxis has solved some of the hardest problems in syntax. Here it fails utterly and must fail because the infinitive is, by virtue of its origin, dependent, subordinate. Assumption of a prepositional combination is simplicity itself in comparison. Meierheim thinks that πρὶν has no influence on the sense of the infinitive. Herzog (ap. Capelle) suggests that there is an ellipsis of 'es soll kommen.' This would not be true even as a translation in many instances. The notion of destiny and obligation can be evoked at will from the infinitive. So even with the articular infinitive. Hence πρὶν ἐλθεῖν = πρὸ τοῦ ἐλθεῖν = πρὸ τοῦ δεῖν ἐλθεῖν. But the elliptical theory is naught. Herzog's view by the way does not differ essentially from Kühner's. K. translates: πολλοὶ ἀνθρωποι πρότερον ἀποθνήσκουσι πρὶν δῆλοι γένεσθαι οἷοι ἦσαν by *prius moriuntur quam ut fieri possit ut appareat quales fuerint. Ut fieri possit ut* should have been buried with Gottfried Hermann. Capelle himself thinks that πρὶν worked its way into a quasi-preposition, and then—thanks to the changed nature of the infinitive and to the bridge of πρὶν γ' ὅτε,—into a conjunction. If πρὶν γ' ὅτε is a bridge, the bridge is in the accus. (comp. ἔσπε for ἐς ὅτε, which, however, I doubt), and the infinitive is in the accusative likewise, which would be in accordance with the degradation of prepositional combinations in later Greek. Delbrück, in his Grundlagen s. 124, simply refers to Capelle.

I shall now proceed to give a conspectus of the usage of the Attic orators in regard to πρὶν. The collection of the examples cited is due to the diligence of the students in my Greek Seminarium who divided the work among themselves.¹ The basis of the arrangement was furnished by an article on πρὶν which I prepared some months since for another purpose. In preparing that article I had felt the need of such a conspectus, and as I had noted most of the passages in the orators for my own satisfaction, I was glad to secure the means of completing and rectifying my own

¹ The members of the Seminary and other students, who joined in the search, are Messrs. Alexander, Bevier, Burgess, Fleming, Gjellum, Harding, Nicolassen, Seelye, Short, Spieker, C. M. and W. J. Tidball. Mr. E. S. Burgess has done me the great service of comparing the references with my hand edition of the orators, and has in this way secured greater correctness and gained additional examples from my marginal notes.

results. The work of collection is much more difficult than might be supposed, and requires keener vision than most unpractised students possess, and I dare not be confident that no example has escaped. Still it is hoped that as a preliminary survey this conspectus will be of service. Under each head I have given a brief statement of the facts as to the Greek use generally, which is followed by the statistic of oratorical usage, and to facilitate the general view I have prefixed the following table :

- I. *Πρὶν* with infinitive.
 - A. Aorist :
 1. After positive clauses.
 2. After negative clauses.
 - B. Present :
 - C. Perfect :
- II. *Πρὶν* with finite verb.
 - A. Indicative :
 1. Aorist.
 - a. After negative clauses :
(1) of facts, (2) of unrealities.
 - b. After positive clauses.
 2. Imperfect.
 - B. Subjunctive (after negative clauses only) :
 1. Aorist.
 2. Present.
 - C. Optative :
 1. Aorist.
 - D. Optative with *ἄν*.
- I. *Πρὶν* with Inf.

This is the typical construction, *πρὶν ἐλθεῖν* = (the much later) *πρὸ τοῦ ἐλθεῖν* 'before coming.' It is the reigning combination in Hom., who employs it after positive and negative clauses alike. In Attic it is more frequently found after positive clauses, and is necessary there when the action does not take place or is not to take place (= *ᾧσ τε μή*). The tense is regularly the aor. on account of the negative sense (*οὐπω, μήπω*).

A. AORIST :

1. The correlated clause positive.

The leading clause is positive in : *ναῖε δὲ Πηδαίον πρὶν ἐλθεῖν υἱας Ἀχαιῶν* Il. 13, 172, cf. 8, 453 ; 16, 322, Od. 1, 210, etc. ; *Ζεὺς δ' ἐσσεῖε*

βίην πρὶν ἡμῖν πῆμα φουτεῦσαι Od. 4, 668, etc., cf. Il. 6, 465; 24, 245, Pind. Pyth. 2, 92. 3, 9, Nem. 8, 19, Hdt. 6, 119, Aesch. Pers. 712, Ag. 1539, Suppl. 38, Sept. 63. 285, etc., Soph. Antig. 120, Trach. 396, etc., Eur. Alc. 281, Andr. 268, H. F. 936, etc., Ar. Eq. 258, Vesp. 1325, Plut. 376, etc., Thuc. 1, 125, 2, Xen. An. 4, 1, 7, etc., Plat. Protag. 350 A.

In the Orators:

Antiphon: (*φθάνωσι*) 1, 29; 2, β, 3¹; 5, 40; 5, 67; 5, 76; 6, 37.

Andokides: 1, 67; (*πρότερον*) 1, 89; [4], 5.

Lysias: 7, 9; 12, 17; (*πρῶτον*) 13, 17; 13, 52; (*πρότερον*) 16, 4; 19, 7; 19, 42; 19, 51; 20, 31; 23, 15; 26, 3; (*πρότερον*) 30, 3; fr. 18, 1.

Isokrates: (*πρότερον*) 3, 17; (*πρότερον*) 4, 37; (*φθῆναι*) 4, 87; 4, 116; 4, 141; (*ἐφθάρτε*) 5, 7; (*πρότερον*) 5, 70 (really positive); 6, 26 (*bis*); (*πρότερον πρὶν ἢ?*) 6, 86; 8, 52; 8, 74; (*τυχὸν ἀν φθάσειε*) 8, 120; 8, 126; 9, 49; 9, 64; (*πρότερον*) 12, 205; 12, 250; 14, 21; (*πρότερον*) 15, 274; 16, 15; 17, 30; 18, 39; 18, 45; 20, 14.

Isaios: 1, 31; (*πρότερον*) 2, 19; 2, 42; 3, 10; 3, 36; 3, 38; 5, 9; 5, 44; 6, 13; 6, 38; 8, 8; 9, 3; 9, 24; (*πρότερον*) 9, 32; 11, 10; 11, 22.

Deinarchos: 2, 12; 2, 24.

Aischines: 1, 192; 1, 195; 2, 61; (*πρότερον πρὶν ἢ?*) 2, 132; 2, 135; 2, 140; 2, 147; 3, 12; (*πρὶν ἢ*) 3, 25; 3, 77; 3, 85; 3, 131; 3, 219; 3, 235.

Demosthenes 3, 2; (*πρότερον*) [7], 28; 8, 6; [10], 11; [17], 7; 18, 30; 18, 50; 18, 169; 18, 224; 19, 2; 19, 41; 19, 79; 19, 155; 19, 155; 19, 230; 19, 266; 20, 145; 21, 82; 21, 226; 30, 28; 30, 30; (*πρὶν ἢ*) 33, 34; 34, 35; 34, 41; (*πρὶν ἢ*) 35, 3; 37, 59; 39, 5; 39, 29; 44, 35; 44, 36; 44, 38; 44, 41; [46], 24; [47], 28; (*πρότερον*) 48, 46; 53, 11; 55, 3; 55, 14 (parallel with *πρότερον ἢ*); 55, 23; 57, 27 (really pos.); (*πρότερον*) [59], 51; (*φθάνουσιν*) [59], 100, [59], 109.

I omit the *προοίμια* in which all the occurrences depend on positives except *πρ. εἰ: μηδὲν . . . οὔτεσθαι πρότερον γιγνώσκειν πρὶν μαθεῖν*.

2. The correlated clause negative.

The leading clause is negative in: οὐδ' ὅ γε πρὶν Δαναοῖσιν ἀεικέα

¹ The dash under the references denotes that the *πρὶν* clause precedes.

λοιγὸν ἀπώσσει πρὶν γ' ἀπὸ πατρὸς φίλῳ δόμεναι ἐλιχώπιδα κούρηγ' II. I, 97; 19, 423, etc., Od. 2, 127; 4, 747, etc. In post-Homeric Greek this construction is not so common, the negative antecedent generally suggesting a finite construction, fulfilled, unfulfilled, or anticipated (οὐ πρότερον πρὶν = οὐ πρότερον ἔως, cf. Lys. 12, 71; 25, 26; Isokr. 17, 12; Plat. Phaedo 59 E). Still the infinitive is found, especially when there is a marked contrast between 'before' and 'after' and in connection with verbs of fear as in Soph. Tr. 632, Eur. fr. 462 (N.), and unfulfilled conditions as in Eur. Alc. 362, cf. Rhes. 61; so after a negated opt. with ἄν (though here subj. with ἄν is an alternative construction), οὕτω γὰρ γένοιτ' ἄν οὐδ' ἄν ἔχθρας στρατοῦ πρὶν ὄρμῃ ναῦν θρασυθῆναι Aesch. Suppl. 773, cf. Plat. Legg. 6, 769 E:—so after a past tense (orat. obliq.), ὥμουςαν μὴ πρὶν ἐς Φώκαιαν ἦξεν πρὶν ἢ τὸν μύθρον τοῦτον ἀναφανῆναι Hdt. I, 165, cf. 4, 9, Thuc. 7, 50, 4, cf. 5, 10, 3, Xen. Hell. 6, 5, 23, Cyr. 8, 1, 38, Plat. Phaedo 61 A. Notice also the passages in which πρὶν precedes, πρὶν ἰδεῖν δ' οὐδεὶς μάντις Soph. Ai. 1418. The opt. is not a favorite, and the inf., which has an analogous use, is often employed instead.

These passages are comparatively so uncommon in the orators that it will require no great space to quote the text. The infinitive is necessary, as I have said, whether the correlated clause be negative or positive if the notion is only and necessarily 'before' and not 'until.'

Andokides: I, 43: ὅπως μὴ πρότερον νύξ ἔσται πρὶν πυθέσθαι τοὺς ἀνδρας ἀπαντας. The positive (the coming of night) is the thing feared. The conception is not ἔως ἄν πύθωνται, but rather ὥστε μὴ πυθέσθαι.

[4], 8: πρὶν μὲν γὰρ χριθῆναι οὐ ῥάδιον(ῆν) εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας οὐτ' εἰ ψευθεῖς εἰσιν οὐτ' εἰ ἀληθεῖς * ἀποφυγόντος δὲ κτέ.—πρὶν precedes: sharp contrast between 'before' and 'after,' ἀποφυγόντος being equivalent to ἐπειδὴν δὲ τις ἀποφύγῃ.

Lysias 19, 28: Ἀριστοφάνει πρὶν τὴν ναυμαχίαν νικῆσαι οὐδὲν ἦν ἀλλ' ἢ χωρίδιον μικρὸν Ῥαμνοῦντι. πρὶν precedes. The 'until' formula was not present to the mind of the speaker. Besides πρὶν . . . ἐνίκησεν=ἔως ἐνίκησεν might have suggested that Aristophanes became rich afterwards, whereas the object of the speaker is to prove that οὐ κατέλιπεν Ἀριστοφάνης ἀργύριον οὐδὲ χρυσίον.

19, 55: οὔτε . . . ὥφθηγ' οὐδεπώποτε πρὶν ταύτην τὴν συμφορὰν γενέσθαι, where the indicative might have been employed.

Fr. 18, 2: καὶ γὰρ Ἀρμυδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι οὐδὲν πρότερον ὑπῆρχε γενναῖον πρὶν γενναῖόν τι πράξαι.

Isokrates 5, 70: ὅταν . . . δεδίδωσι μὴ πρότερόν τι πάθῃς πρὶν τέλος ἐπιτείνειν, not 'until,' but 'before.'

20, 14: οὐχ οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν αἰσθέσθαι πρὶν κακῶς τινὰς παθεῖν ὅπ' αὐτῶν (where πρὶν ἄν with subj. would be more usual; still there is a strong contrast to 'after,' ἐπειδὴν γνωρισθῶσι).

Isaios 5, 21: οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὶν ἡττηθῆναι εἶχεν ὦν ἡμεῖς δικαζόμεθα—where the whole statement πρὶν ἡττηθῆναι εἶχεν is denied. 4, 15: ἐκ τίνος ἂν τρόπου . . . γνώητε (=οὐκ ἂν γνώητε) πρὶν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ διαθέσθαι πιστεῦσαι; the inf. where the less usual opt. would be the theoretical construction.

Lycurg. 135: πρὶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο πρᾶξαι Λεωκράτην ἄδην ἦν ὁποῖοι τινες ὄντες ἐτύχχανον, νῦν δ' ἐκ τῆς, where the contrast is to be noted.

Aischines: Only in the Letters 4, 1; οὐδ' ἄπει πρὶν μακρᾶς ἀκοῦσαι διηγῆσεως.

Demosthenes 3, 12: πρὶν δὲ ταῦτα πρᾶξαι μὴ σκοπεῖτε (πρὶν precedes).

3, 13: πρὶν δὲ ταῦτα εὐτρεπίσαι — μηδὲν' ἀξιούτε.

5, 15: καὶ μοι μὴ θορυβήσῃ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι.

19, 165: οὐδὲ βαδίζειν προσῆκε πρὶν ἐλθεῖν τὸν κήρυκα (where ἐλθοι would have been unusual, and ἦλθε with προσῆκε might have produced a wrong impression. Comp. 20, 96).

23, 187: οὐθ' ὅλως πρότερον πρὶν τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτ' ἐγενέσθαι λόγον ἐποιησάμην οὐδένα.

30, 33: αὐτὴ ἡ γυνὴ πρὶν ὥς Ἀφοβὸν ἐλθεῖν μίαν ἡμέραν οὐκ ἐχρήρευσεν (where ἔως ἦλθεν would not give the required sense).

[58], 63: πρὶν προσελθεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες, νῦν εὐποροῦντες οὐδὲ χάριν ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν.

B. PRESENT.

The Inf. pres. gives a special sense of continuance, effort, or the like, 'before undertaking to,' 'proceeding to,' πρὶν ἐξοπλιζέειν Ἀρη Aesch. Suppl. 702, cf. Ag. 1026; πρὶν νῦν τὰ πλεῖον ἱστορεῖν . . . ἐξέλθε Soph. O. C. 36, 37, cf. El. 20; πρὶν κλάειν Eur. Andr. 577, cf. Or. 1095; πρὶν λέγειν Ar. Thesm. 380, cf. Ach. 383, 384; also Hdt. 8, 3, Thuc. 3, 24, 2, Xen. Cyr. 2, 4, 25, etc., Comm. 1, 2, 40.

Not often in the orators:

Antiphon 5, 25: πρὶν ἀνάγεσθαι με εἰς τὴν Αἴνον—οὐδεὶς χ' ἐτίασατό με ἀνθρώπων. The πρὶν clause precedes. Notice the πρὶν ἄγειν, cited from Homer A 97 (p. 467).

Andokides [4], 1: πρότερον χαλεπὸν ἡγούμην πρὶν τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τινος.

Lysias 13, 81: πρὶν εἰσιέναι εἰς τὸ ἄστυ ὁ μὲν Αἴσιμος αἰσθάνεται.

Isokrates 4, 157: ἀράς ποιῶνται πρὶν ἄλλο τι χρηματίζειν. 8, 40: καταγέλαστον ἐστὶ . . . τοὺς λόγους ἀποδοκιμάζειν πρὶν εἰδέναι (=pres.). 15, 75: εἶπον δὲ πού πρὶν ἀναγινώσκεισθαι τούτους.

Aischines 1, 116: συνῆστε μὲν καὶ πρὶν ἐμὲ λέγειν. 2, 92: πόσαις πρότερον ἡμέραις ἀπώλεσε τὴν ἀρχὴν πρὶν ἐμὲ ἀπέναι—πρὶν ἐμὲ ἐξορμᾶν οἴχοθεν ἀπωλώλει. 3, 73: τοῦτ' ἔπραξαν . . . πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑστέραν ἀπαίρειν πρεσβεῖαν Δημοσθένην.

Demosthenes 21, 162: πρὶν καὶ προξέδρους καθίζεσθαι, παρελθὼν ἐπέδωκεν. 39, 23: πρὶν ἡμέτερος φάσκειν συγγενὴς εἶναι . . . ἐφοίτα. 53, 28: πρὶν ὀφείλειν τῷ δημοσίῳ ὁ Ἀρεθούσιος ὡμολογεῖτο τῶν ἀδελφῶν εὐπορώτατος εἶναι. [59], 78: ἐξορκοὶ τὰς γεραιὰς . . . πρὶν ἄπτεσθαι τῶν ἱερῶν. [59], 90: κελεύει . . . ὁ νόμος . . . τὴν ψῆφον διδόναι προσόντι τῷ δήμῳ πρὶν τοὺς ξένους εἰσιέναι—comp. πρὶν εἰσιέναι: Lys. 13, 81).

The present infinitive in these passages can readily be appreciated. If translation is a test, the renderings above recommended will apply.

C. PERFECT:

If there were no essential difference between aor. and perf. inf. as Bäumlein maintains, πρὶν with the perf. inf. ought to occur more frequently, but, on the contrary, it is rare. I find only the following examples recorded in the collections made:

Lys. 6, 11: πρὶν ἢ (?) ἐπιθεδημηχέναι δέξα ἡμέρας ἐν τῇ πόλει προσεκαλέσατο.

Isaios 7, 27: πρὶν ἦκεν=perf. Comp. Hdt. 6, 116; Thuc. 5, 10, 3.

Aischines 3, 116: χρυσᾶς ἀσπίδας ἀνέθεμεν πρὸς τὸν καινὸν νεὼν πρὶν ἐξειργάσθαι (v. l.).

Dem. 51, 5: πρὶν γὰρ ἦφθαι μόνον τῆς τριήρους τούτους ἐπεπλήρωτό μοι. 53, 13: πρὶν ἐξῆκεν τὰς ἡμέρας.

In all such passages οὕτω with the pluperfect would be the natural equivalent.

II. Πρὶν with the finite verb.

A. INDICATIVE:

The tense of the indicative is chiefly aor. Hom. does not combine πρὶν directly with the ind. (unless we count Hymn. Apoll. 357), but uses instead πρὶν γ' ὅτε, πρὶν γ' ὅτε δή, after positive and negative clauses. Posit., ἡλώμην . . . πρὶν γ' ὅτε . . . ἡγάγες Od. 13, 322; ἔχον πρὶν γ' ὅτε δή με . . . κάλεσεν 23, 44,

cf. Il. 12, 437 :—negat., οὐδέ κεν ἡμέας ἄλλο διέκρινεν . . . πρίν γ' ὅτε δὴ θανάτοι . . . νέφος ἀμφεκάλυψεν Od. 4, 180. The imperf. occurs, οὐδ' ὥς τοῦ θυμὸν . . . ἔπειθον πρίν γ' ὅτε δὴ θάλαμος πύκα βάλλετο (*began to be hit*) Il. 9, 587.

1. Aor.

(a.) After negative clauses :

(1) of a fact in the past, οὐκ ἦν ἀλέξῃμι' οὐδὲν . . . πρίν γ' ἐγὼ σφίσιιν ἔδειξα Aesch. Pr. 478 sqq.; οὐ πρότερον ἀπανέστη . . . Μαρδόνιος πρίν ἢ σφας ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο Hdt. 6, 45, cf. c. 79; ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὥς . . . ἡξίωσαν νεώτερόν τι ποιεῖν ἐς αὐτόν . . . πρίν γε δὴ αὐτοῖς μηχανῆς γίγνεται (Hist. pr.=aor.) Thuc. 1, 132, cf. 3, 101; 5, 61, Ar. Av. 700, Xen. Cyr. 1, 4, 23; 4, 5, 13, (Hist. pr.), etc., Hell. 5, 4, 58, etc.

In the Orators :

Lys. 3, 7: οὐ πρότερον ἠθέλησεν ἀπελθεῖν πρίν αὐτόν . . . ἐξήλασαν (οὐ πρότερον . . . ἕως occurs 12, 71 and 25, 26).

Isokrates 4, 89: οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσατο πρίν ἐξεῦρε κτέ. So also 4, 181; 8, 68; 9, 32; 12, 83; 12, 91; 12, 158; 12, 231; 12, 256; 15, 11; 15, 318; 16, 5. In 12, 83 he has οὐκ ἀπεῖπε . . . πρίν, in 12, 256 οὐκ ἀπεῖπειν . . . πρίν, in 15, 11 οὐκ ἀπέστην πρίν, in all the others οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσατο πρίν or an equivalent. Isokrates was not the man to leave a good balance unused. (For οὐ πρότερον ἕως see 17, 12.)

Isaios frag. 13, 1: οὐ πρότερον ἀφῆκε πρίν τριάκοντα δραχμὰς ἐπράξατο.

Lykurgos 128: οὐ πρότερον ἀπῆλθον πρίν ἢ (?) τῷ λιμῶ ἀπέκτειναν.

Demosthenes 8, 65 (cf. [10], 67): οὐκ ἦν ἐν θήβαις ἀσφαλὲς πρίν τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἀπέδωκε. Cf. [17], 20: οὐ πρότερον πρίν (οὐδ'?)

(2) As an integral part of an unreal condition and the like, οὐκ ἂν ἐσκεφάμεθα πρότερον . . . πρίν ἐζητήσαμεν Plat. Meno 86 D, cf. Theaetet. 165 E.

So with χρῆν μὴ . . .

Isokrates 4, 19: ἐχρῆν μὴ πρότερον . . . συμβουλεύειν πρίν (πρίν ἢ Γ') ἡμᾶς . . . ἐδίδασαν.

Demosthenes 20, 96: χρῆν τοίνυν Λεπτίην μὴ πρότερον τιθέναι τὸν, ἑαυτοῦ νόμον πρίν τοῦτον ἔλυσεν γραψάμενος.

(b.) After positive clauses :

Examples are to be found in Soph. O. R. 775; Eur. Hec. 132 Med. 1173; Thuc. 7, 71, 5, etc. On the cryptonegative and the invariable 'until' see above, p. 469.

I have but one noted in the orators.

Aischines 1, 64: προσεπολέμει Ἀριστοφῶντι (=οὐκ ἐπαύσατο προσπολεμῶν Ἀ.) πρὶν αὐτῷ τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην ἡπείλησεν ἐπαγγελίαν κτέ.

2. Imperfect.

This is rare, as also *ἕως* *until* with imperf. indic. There is a notion of overlapping.

Antiphon 1, 19: οὐπω γὰρ ἤδει ὑπὸ τῆς μητροῦς τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξαπατωμένη πρὶν ἐν τῷ κακῷ ἤδη ᾗν.

Isaios 5, 7: οὐδεὶς ἡξίωσε πρὶν οὕτως . . . ἡμφισβήτει.

Demosthenes 9, 61: οὐ πρότερον ἐτόλμησεν οὐδεὶς ῥῆξαι φωνὴν πρὶν πρὸς τείχῃ προσήεσαν (began to approach).

In [Andok.] 4, 17: καὶ οὐ πρότερον ἀπηλλάγη πρὶν ἀποδράς ὅχρετο τετάρτῳ μηνί, the imperf. is only a *pro forma* imperf. and the real notion is ἀπέδρα.

B. SUBJUNCTIVE¹:

The subjunctive is used after negatives or equiv. of neg. only, οὐ πρὶν = *ἕως*, ἢν μή. The notion is distinctly conditional (cf. Isokr. 4, 173, where πρὶν ἄν varies with ἢν μή). Hom. has πρὶν with subj. οὐ καταδυσόμεθ', ἀχνύμενοι περ . . . πρὶν μόρσιμον ἦμαρ ἐπέλθῃ Od. 10, 174, 175; μή πω καταδύσειο . . . πρὶν γ' ἐμὲ . . . ἴδῃαι Il. 18, 135, cf. v. 190 (half quotation of v. 135), 24, 78. (In Il. 17, 506, πρὶν κε w. subj., according to the best MSS., follows an inf. after a negat.) Also πρὶν γ' ὅτ' ἄν: ἀλλ' ὁμοσον μὴ μητρὶ φίλῃ τάδε μυθήσασθαι, πρὶν γ'

¹ Hermann opusc. III 179 seqq. asks the question why we can say οὐ ποιήσω πρὶν ἂν κελεύσης and cannot say ποιήσω πρὶν ἂν κελεύσῃς, although either ποιήσω or οὐ ποιήσω πρὶν κελεύσαι is correct. Πρὶν κελεύσαι, he says, is equivalent to πρὸ τοῦ κελεύσαι, and whether the action happens or not, it is certain that it is done or not done before the order. But ποιήσω πρὶν ἂν κελεύσῃς would mean 'faciam prius, quam quo tempore tu mandaveris, quod nescio an sis unquam mandaturus.' And this is seriously quoted in a Jena dissertation of 1878 by Karl Finsterwalder (de coniunctivi et optativi . . . usu Aeschineo p. 26) with the remark *optime disputavit Hermannus*, and is given as a valid reason for the exclusion of πρὶν ἂν with the subj. after positive sentences. *Quod nescio an sit unquam* and the rest would apply perfectly well to πρὶν with the inf., in which, so far as the language goes, the realization of the infinitive is left in perfect suspense. Is it necessary to repeat that language settles into certain grooves of expression? Theoretically you might have πρὶν ἂν after a positive sentence. There is no logic against it, any more than there is against ὅτε or ἐπειδὴ with the fut. ind. In later Greek πρὶν ἢ with the subj. is common enough after affirmative sentences. But it could not be made to mean any more that πρὶν with the inf., which admits the negative conditional notion (ὥστε, ἐφ' ᾧτε μή) although it does not demand it.

ὅτ' ἂν ἐνδεκάτῃ τε δυωδεκάτῃ τε γένηται Od. 2, 373. 374, cf. 4, 475. 477. In Prose the rule is *πρὶν ἂν*, but the simple *πρὶν* is found; as also *πρὶν ἢ* (often in Hdt.) Editors often correct in Attic writers.

1. Aorist.

This is the reigning tense. The action in the dependent clause is to happen before the action in the leading clause, which is usu. in fut. ind. or some equivalent such as universal present, inv., subj., opt. w. *ἂν* (*repraesentatio* after past tenses is also common), οὐ γαμέσεται παρθένος οὐδεμία πρὶν ἂν τῶν πολέμιων ἄνδρα ἀποκτείνειη Hdt. 4, 117; cf. 1, 82; 3, 109, etc.; ὡν δ' οὐδέν ἐστι τέρμα μοι προκείμενον. μόχθων (= οὐ παύσομαι) πρὶν ἂν Ζεὺς ἐκπέσῃ τυραννίδος Aesch. Pr. 756, cf. 166, 176, etc.; οὐ γάρ ποτ' ἔξει τῆσδε τῆς χώρας πρὶν ἂν . . στήσῃς ἄγων Soph. O. C. 909, cf. 47. 1041, O. R. 1529, etc.; οὐκ ἂν ἐκμάθοις . . πρὶν ἂν θάνῃ τις Trach. 2; οὐκ ἄπειμι πρὸς δόμους πάλιν, πρὶν ἂν σε . . ἔξω βάλω Eur. Med. 276, cf. 680, Alc. 1145 sqq., I. A. 324, I. T. 19, 1302, etc.; μὴ προκυταγίγνωσκ(ε) . . πρὶν ἂν γ' ἀκούσῃς ἀμφοτέρων Ar. Vesp. 919 sq., cf. Ach. 176, 230, etc., Xen. Hiero 6, 13, Cyr. 1, 2, 8, An. 1, 1, 10; 5, 7, 12, Plat. Phaedr. 228 C, Laches 187 E, etc.

The following are the occurrences in the orators:

Andok. 1, 7: οὐχ οἶόν τε ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι πρὶν ἂν καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀκούσῃτε ἀπολογουμένων.

Lys. 19, 5: εἰκὸς μήπω ἡγεῖσθαι πιστοὺς πρὶν ἂν καὶ ἡμεῖς εἴπωμεν. Also 22, 4 with *πρότερον* preceding.

Isokrates 5, 86: δεῖ γάρ μηδὲν πρότερον πράττειν πρὶν ἂν λάβῃ τις. Also 1, 24; 4, 16; 4, 173; (*πρότερον*) 5, 88; (*πρότερον*) 8, 26; (*πρότερον*) 12, 152; (*πρότερον*) 14, 18; 15, 17; 15, 290.

Aischines 1, 145: ἀπόμνησι μηδὲν τούτων πράξειν πρὶν τὴν τοῦ "Εκτορος κεφαλὴν ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ Πατρόκλου τάφον ἐνέγκῃ. Also: (*πρότερον*) 2, 2; 3, 26; (no *ἂν*) 3, 60; (*πρότερον*) 3, 235.

Hypereid. pro Euxenipp. 20 has πρὶν ἐξετάσωσιν where some editors would read πρὶν ἂν.

Demosthenes 2, 27: φημι δὲ δεῖν—μηδὲν αἰτιᾶσθαι πρὶν ἂν τῶν πραγμάτων χρητήσῃτε. So 4, 41; 8, 61 = [10] 63; [13], 14; 23, 29; 23, 80; (*πρότερον*) 23, 179; 38, 24.

2. Present.

The pres. subj. is comparatively rare. The actions overlap, or there are special reasons, μήπω πρὶν ἂν τῶν ἡμετέρων αἰγῆς (no aor. in Attic) μύθων Soph. Phil. 1409; Xen. Cyr. 2, 2, 8; Plat. Phaedr. 271 C.

Aischines 1, 10: ὁ νομοθέτης τὰ διδασκαλεῖα ἀνοίγειν ἀπαγορεύει μὴ πρότερον πρὶν ἂν ὁ ἡλίος ἀνίσχῃ (antithesis πρὸ ἡλίου δεδυκότος).

Demosthenes [10] 29: *ὁμῆϊς τοίνυν οὐκ ἀκούειν πρὶν ἂν ὥσπερ νῦν ἀπὸ παρῇ τὰ πράγματα . . . εἰώθατε* where the *ὥσπερ νῦν* has its influence.

Omission of *ἂν* in Antiphon 1, 29: *οὐδὲν ἴσασιν πρὶν γ' ἤδη ἐν αὐτῷ ὥσι τῷ κακῷ*.

C. OPTATIVE:

Πρὶν with Opt. (1) represents subj. after historical tenses, *οὐκ ἔθελεν φεύγειν πρὶν πειρήσασθαι Ἀχιλλεύς* Il. 21, 580; *πρὶν γ' ὅτε*, as with subj., 9, 488; *ἔδοξέ μοι μὴ σίγα πρὶν φράσαιμί σοι | τὸν πλοῦτον ποιεῖσθαι* Soph. Phil. 551, Thuc. 3, 22, 8; Xen. Cyr. 1, 4, 14; Hell. 6, 5, 19 (cf. 2, 4, 18), An. 1, 2, 2; Plat. Apol. 36 C; Legg. 3, 678 D. (2) by assimilation, (a) after pure opt., *ῥλοιο μὴπω πρὶν μάθοιμι* Soph. Phil. 960, Trach. 655. (β) after opt. with *ἂν*: *οὐκ ἂν πρότερον ὁρμήσειε πρὶν βεβαιώσαιτο* Plat. Legg. 7, 799 D.

Πρὶν with opt. seems to be little used in the orators. In the collections before me I find only:

Isokrates 9, 63; *εἰθισμένων τὸν ἄλλον χρόνον μὴ διαλλάττεσθαι τοῖς ἀποστᾶσι πρὶν κύριοι γένοιτο τῶν σωμαμάτων*. 16, 5: *οὐχ ἡγούντ' οὐδὲν οἰοί τ' εἶναι κινεῖν τῶν καθεστῶτων πρὶν ἐκποδὸν ἐκείνους αὐτοῖς γένοιτο*.

D. OPTATIVE AND ἂν:

Πρὶν ἂν with opt. is rare and doubtful. Where it is not an error of the copyist, the *ἂν* is held over from the original form of *oratio recta*.

Antiphon 5, 34: *ἀπαγορευόντων τῶν φίλων τῶν ἐμῶν μὴ ἀποκτείνειν τὸν ἄνδρα πρὶν ἂν (?) ἐγὼ ἔλθοιμι* (o. r. *πρὶν ἂν ἐκείνους ἔλθῃ*); cf. Xen. Hell. 2, 3, 48. 4, 18; this was to be expected in the liveliness of spoken Greek.

On reviewing the usage of the orators in regard to *πρὶν* we can hardly fail to notice a certain crystallization. It is true that the fundamental construction with the infinitive is used occasionally with negative sentences that might have assumed the finite form, but the exceptions weigh little in comparison with the whole number, and we are far from the Homeric freedom, much nearer the scenic norm. *Πρὶν* with the infin. after affirmative sentences is the rule. *Πρὶν* with the indicative after affirmative sentences, which occurs in Sophokles, Euripides and Thukydides, appears, if I may trust my collections, only once, and that in the play-actor Aischines. Perfect infinitive and present infinitive are rare and carefully used,

and there seems to me little good warrant for $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ ἤ or the omission of $\acute{\alpha}\nu$. $\acute{\alpha}\nu$ in temporal sentences of limit ($\xi\omega\varsigma$, $\xi\sigma\tau\epsilon$, $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\chi\rho\iota$, $οὐ\kappa$ $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$, $\mu\eta$ $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$) may be omitted, as a survival of an older construction, just as we use *be* instead of *is* where there is an element of purpose; but in prose this omission should be suffered very charily. $\Pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ ἤ is so common in later Greek that one suspects the copyists. Of individual peculiarities in the handling there is not much to say. Demosthenes does not seem to use the particle as much as might have been expected, but all statistics of this sort are full of surprises. Where he does use it he uses it simply, while Isokrates in his more formal orations treats $\pi\rho\acute{\sigma}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ — $\pi\rho\acute{\iota}\nu$ as he does everything, in the interest of his aesthetic seesaw and fastidious rhythm. There is more masculinity in the abruptness which characterizes Lysias' usage; but I do not wish to refine too much. Nothing is more attractive than ethical results to the syntactical investigator, nothing more 'putid' to the looker-on.

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